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580 REYNOLDS V. REYNOLDS [21 C.2d 
as. much the duty of the petitioner to furnish the record to 
be reviewed as it is the duty of an appellant to have a tran-
script before the court. (1, X. L. Lime Co. v. Superior 
Court, 143 Cal. 170 [76 P. 973] ; Goodrich v. Superior Court, 
92 Oal.App. 695 [268 P. 669]; James v~ Police Court, 39 
Cal.App. 362 [178 P. 867].) For on certiorari, the court 
is limited to a review of the properly authenticated record 
of the proceeding. (Borchard v. Board 01 Supervisors, 144 
Cal. 10 [77 P. 708]; St1tmpl v. Board 01 Supervisors, 131 
CaL 364 [63 P.663; 82 Am.St.Rep. 350]; Goodrich v. Su-
perior Courl;supra; Donovan v. Board 01 Police Commis-
sioners, 32 Cal.App. 392 [163 P. 69].) 
The petitioner has neither complied with this fundamental 
rule of procedure nor offered any excuse for the lack of a 
record. The writ must therefore be discharged and the 
proceeding dismissed. 
It is so ordered. 
Gibson, ,C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Schauer, J., concurred. . 
[L. A. No. 17925. In Bank. Feb. 16, 1943.] 
HELENE LOUISE REYNOLDS, Respondent, v. JACOB 
GEORGE REYNOLDS, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Support of Children-Modification-Notice of Mo-
tion.-A defendant in a divorce action over whom the court 
has secured jurisdiction cannot avoid the continuing juris-
diction of the court to change its orders for support of chil-
dren by discharging his attorney and moving out of the state. 
Hence, an order in the ex.ercise of such jurisdiction may be 
predicated on an order to show cause and notice of motion 
served on the attorney of record in the action, although the de-
fendant has departed from the state and has formally dis-
charged his attorney. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1015.) 
[2] Id.-Support of Children-Modification-Notice of Motion.-
Service of notice of motion to modify a divorce judgment as 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Divorce and Separation, § 300(2); 
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respects the allowance for support ofchiIdre~ may :b~,:m:aae, 
upon the defendant's attorney of record in· the . a~tion·'tinm . 
a change of attorneys is made hi the manner' prescribed:·~t 
law or until the discharge of·the attorney is noted in' the 
record. In case of such a discharge, service may. be made. on' 
the clerk of the court. 
[3] ld.-Counsel Fees and Costs-Notice o.f Application;...,..A·nO'- . 
ticeof motion for allowance of attorney's feef!latid,.costs. :on 
appeal from an order modifying .a divorce judgmetitmay be 
served on the· attorneys appomted to challenge. the ju;isdic~ 
tion of the court to entertain tp.e motion and' to.represen~tlie 
party. on appeal, although th.e prescribed proce:dure. for)~~stt­
tution of attorneys was not followed. . . ,'. . . . .. , ., ' 
[4] War-Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act;.-:.])efault·J.ud.gment':';" 
Soldiers' and. Sa~lors' Relief Act, § 200(54 ·Stats~· L . .11S·0, 
50 U.S.C.A., Appn., §520) relating to defs:hltjudgIrients, 'does 
not apply where the defendant has ·appointedhi~'o:Wn attor~ 
ney to protect his interests, even though. t1).es.uihorlty con· 
ferred is limited to a special appearance to contest the juriS:-
diction of the court. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of LosAri-
geles County modifying .an interlocutory judgment by' in-
creasing the allowimM for support of children and"for pay-
ment of costs and attorney's fees on appeal. William. S. 
Baird, Judge. Affirmed. 
Freston & Files, Gordon L. Files and Ralph E. Lewis for 
Appellant. 
Leonard Comegys for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-An interlocutory judgment of divorce, 
entered on October 24, 1933, gave custody of the two minor 
children to the wife and ord,ered defendant to pay $40 moiith-,. 
ly for' their support. A final judgment WM entered on' Oc-
tober 29, 1934. The pleadings on behalf of, defendant and' 
the stipulation to set the case for trial were signed "Loucks 
and Phister, Attorneys for Defendant;" On' October 30, 
1940, plaintiff's attorney mailed to Loucks and Phister ari 
order to show cause and, notice of motionfoi' modificatibn of 
the interlocutory decree to increase the allowance from $55 
per month to which it had previously been raised, to $116 
[4] Soldiers' and Sailors'Civil Relief Acts, note, 130 A.L.R. 774. 
• 
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per month. The affidavit of service states that these papers 
were ,i addressed to the attorneys of record for said defend~ 
ant at the office address of said attorneys,as follows: 
Loucks and Phister ... San Pedro, California." .An affi-
davit shows that copies of the papers were also sent by regis-
teredtnail to the defendant at Fort Des Moines, Iowa, where 
he was then stationed as an officer ·of the United States Army. 
Attached to this affidavit is' a registry return receipt signed 
by defendant acknowledging delivery in Iowa on November 
4, 1940. On the day appointed for a hearing, a special ap-
pearance was, made by defendant's counsel of record on these 
appeals for the sole. purpose' of objecting to the jurisdiction 
of the court on the grounds that defendimt, a nonresident, 
had not been persomtlly served with notice within-this state, 
,that E. O. Loucks had not been counsel for defendant for 
more than three years, and that service by mail upon his 
firm was ineffeGtive. In an affidavit filed in support of this 
objection defendant stated that E. O. Lou.cks did not repre-
sent him after April 7, 1937, and that he wrote to Loucks 
on October 20, 1937, discharging him as his attorney. An 
affidavit by Loucks fully corroborated defendant's affidavit 
and stated that on October 31, 1940 (the day on which the 
notice of motion presumably was received), Loucks wrote 
plaintiff's counsel that his relationship as attorney for de-
fendant officially terminated iIi October, 1937. The court 
ruled that it had jurisdiction, and the hearing on' the motion 
was continued. When the matter again came on for hearing 
defendant offered affidavits showing that although the name 
"Loucks and Phister" had been signed to the pleadings in 
the case in 1934, E. O. Loucks was in fact the only person 
, whom defendant had authorized to represent him, and that 
. the firm of Loucks and Phister had dissolved in February, 
1937. The trial court refused to consider these affidavits and 
after the overruling of renewed 'objections to the jurisdiction 
of the court, defendant's counsel took no further part in the 
proceeding. The court heard plaIntiff's testimony and 
granted the motion, and the first of the present appeals was 
then taken. Plaintiff thereupon made a motion for an order 
requiring defendant to pay her $650 to defray costs and at-
torney's fees OD the appeal from the support order. This 
notice was served upon Fresfon and Files, the attorp.eys who 
, appeared specially at the hearing of- the previous motion and 
who took the appeal from the support order. At the hear-
I 
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ing on the motion for attorney fees,Fresto~ and Files again" 
appeared specially to, object to thejurisdictiori olthe court 
and presented an affidavit that they had no authority. to 
do more. The court ruled that it had jurisdiction, and coun-
sel took no further part in the proceedings. The court grant-
ed the motion, and defendant's secondapp,eal followed. 
[1] The first question is whether the service of the no-
tice and order to show cause upon the attorneys who repre-
sented the defendant iIi the divorce action was valid as a 
service upon attorneys then of, record. After app.earancein 
an action a defendant or his .attorney is entitled to notice, of 
all subsequent proceedings of which notice is required to~e 
given. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1014.) Section 1015 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure provides: "When a plaintiff Or a defen. 
dant, who has appeared, resides out of the State, and has 
no attorney in the action or proceeding, the service maybe 
made on the clerk or On the justice where there is no clerk, 
for him. But in all cases l- where. a party haB an attorney 
in the action or proceeding, the service of papers, when re, 
qtiired, must be upon the attorney instead of the party" ex-
cept certain papers not 'here involved. This provision is 
clearly constitutional, for it is established that the Legisla~ 
ture may provide that once the court has jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of a proceeding and over the person of 
the partY-affected, it may bind such person by orders made 
after he has left the state .. (Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 
[58 S.Ot. 454, 82 L.Ed. 649] ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 
228 U.S. 346 [33 S.Ot. 550, 57 Ii.Ed. 867].) It is conceded 
that the court secured jurisdiction over the defendant in the 
divorce action in 1933 involving the custody and maintenance 
of minors, and since it has continuing' jurisdiction to, change 
from time to time its orders for their support (Civ. Code, 
§§ 138, 139), it follows that a party cannot avoid such juris~ 
diction' by discharging his attorney alid moving out of ,the ' 
state. (M oore v. Superior Court, 203 CaL 23( 242-245 [263 
P. 1009].) " " 
[2] Defendant contends that· it ,is a,question of· fact 
whether a party has an attorney'wHhil:lthemeaning of-se~-, . 
tion 1015 of the ,Code ,of Civil, Procedure, and thatifth~ 
evidence shows conclusively that the' attorney has been ", rus;.: 
charged service' of notices upon hhn is ineffectua,1 'for:a.ny, 





584 REYNOLDS 'V. REYNOLDS [21 C.2d 
in the Moore case, where the court set forth reasons that 
convincingly support the vaiidityof the service in the pres-
ent case. The court stated, however, that it would seem to 
be a question of fact whether a party was represented in 
such a proceeding by an attorney of record. This statement 
was unnecessary to the decision, for the proceeding was in 
certiorari and the holding was that even if the trial court 
had committed error a writ of review would not' lie. A 
client may of cOurse discharge his attorney at any time (see 
3 Cal.Jur. 628,,635), but 'during the course of a proceeding 
service of papers on the attorney of record, where service 
upon the attorney is proper, birids the client until the attor-
ney is discharged or substituted out of the. case in the. man-
ner provided'by law. (Grant v. White, 6 Cal. 55,56; Scar-
pel,v, East Bay Street Rys., 42 Cal.App.2d 32 [115 P.2d 
862].) The court is concerned in such cases not with whether 
the client is represented by' an attorney, but whether he has 
an attorney of record, whether, any change in attorneys has 
beim made as provided. in section 284. of the Code of Civil 
ProGedure, and whether notice, thereof has been given as 
provided in section 285 of' that code. The authority of an 
attorney, however, ordinarily ends with the entry of judg-
ment, 'except for the purpose of enforcing it or having it set 
,aside or reversed. (See 3 Cal.Jur. 668.) Nevertheless the 
judgment of divorce insofar as it relates to the custody and 
maintenance of minor children is not final. As to 'those 
matterS the litigation must' be' regarded as, still pending 
(Rosher v; Superior Court, 9,CaL2d 556, 560 [71 P.2d 9i8J ; 
Lamborn v; Lamborn, 190 Cal. 794 [214 P. 862]; AvilaV'. 
Leonardo,' 53 CaLApp.2d'602, 608 [128. P.2d 43]), and the 
provisions of section 1015 apply as well after as before the 
entry of the judgment. (Moore v. Superior Court, 2030a1. 
238, '242 [263 P. 1009]; see 78 A.L.R. 370, 376.) The at-
torney of record is the person the client has named as his 
agent upon whom service of ,papers maybe made. The stat-
utes informed defendant that if he had no attorney of rec-
ordthe clerk of the court became his agent for the purpose 
of service. The burden lay upon the defendant to keep 
an attorney of record or to make such arrangements' for 
notice with the clerk as he thought advisable. (See W G,sh-
ington e:e rel. Bond&: Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 
289 U.s. 361 [53 S.Ct. 624, 77L.Ed. 1256, 89 A.L.R. 653].) 
If defendant had noted his discharge of Loucks in the rec-
F1eb.1943] REYNOLDS v.' REYNOLDS 
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ord, plaintiff could have made service on, the clerk of the 
court. The record, however, showed Loucks and J?hist~r' as 
counsel, and the court and opposing counsel were' entitled' til 
rely thereon until it was changed·. in, the manner prescribed 
by law. . , , 
[3] The service on Freston and Files of the notice of~o­
tionfor allowance of attorneys' fees and costs' o~!' appeal was 
aJsovalid. They appeared specially to challenge the. jilris-
. diction of, the court on the first motion and'tHed a notice <if 
~appeal from the order granting that motion. Upon'aprope:r 
'showingplaintitf is entitled to suit 'money to prel;ierlfher';si(;le 
on appeal and be represented by counsel. (Lambo1:rI,'V;, Lam-
,born,- 19,0 CaL 794 [214P.8621"j Parker v,par;ke,.;'22"Ca.l. 
App.2d 139 [70P.2d 1003].) Defe~dant app6intetI',F~est6h' 
and Files to represent him in that appeal,irid::they<iiiay ':be ' 
regarded as his attorneys instead of LoUcks and Phister Under 
sec.rlon 101501 the Code of Civil hocedure fo~ ihe servi~~L 
"of papers with respect to ,the appeal, for. it is cleat' not only 
that plaintiff may waive defendarit'si!ailure to ,follow the 
prescribed procedure in the substitution of' att~rney~, .but 
that defendant cannot object to his <wnremissness ... (G1,it 
v: . . Southern Pacific Co., 174 Cal. 84 [161P., 1153]'; Ander .. 
sonv.City Ry. Co., 9 Cal.App;2d 205 '[48 P;2d'969J;) •.. 
[4] Defendant contends 'for the first time 'on ,'appeal that 
,the judgment of the trial court was, entered in violation of 
section 200 of the Soldiers" and .. Sa.ilors', Civil' Relief Act of 
1940. (54 Stat.L. 1180jU.S:C.A:. Titl~ 50,App. '§52().) 
That s~ction, provides in part a.sfollows: '~In any\action or 
proceeding' ~ommenced. in any court, if . there shall he a de-
: fault ,of any appearance by the, defendant, the plaintiff; 
before entering judgment shall file in the court an, affidavit 
setting forth· facts' showing that the defendant· is not in mili-
tary service. If unable to file such affidavit plaintiff ,shall 
in lieu'thereOf file an affidavit setting forth either that 'the 
defendant is. in the military service or tliatplaintiff is not 
aple to determine. whether or n'(jt defendant is in such'service. 
If an affidavit is not filed show,ingthat the defendant is not 
in the'· military service; no judgment shall . be entered with-
out first securing an order of court directing such entry, 
and no such order shall be made, if the defendant is in' 
such service until' after the court shali have appollited an 
attorney.torepresent defendant and protect his interest. ,and 
• 
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the court shall on application' make such appointment." 
This section is designed to protect a defendant in military 
service who does not appear, by insuring the appointment 
of an attorney to represent him. It doeEf not apply, how-
ever,when; as in the present case, the defendant has appoint-
ed his own attorneys _ to protect his interest. There is no 
"aefault of any appearance" in such a case even though the 
defendant chooses to make only a special appearance to con-
-test the jurisdiction of the court and therefore limits the 
_ authority of his attorneys to that issue. If that course proves 
ineffective he can hardly contend that he was not represented 
by counsel. There is nothing in the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act requiring the court to disregard the appoint-
ment of attorneys by the defendant and the course of action 
he decides upon and to appoint another attorney to embark 
upon another course of action on defendant's behalf. (See, 
A Manual of Law for Use by Advisory Boards for Registrants 
Appointed Pursuant to the Sdective Training and Service 
Act of 1940, as amended (2d ed.) Compiled by the Committee 
on War Work of the American Bar Association, 38-71; 130 
A.L.R. 775.) 
The orders appealed from are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., con-
curred. 
[L. A. Nos. 18111, 18206. In Bank. Feb. 16, 1943.J 
Estate of ANITA M. BALDWIN, Deceascd. LOUIS M. 
LISSNER, as Receiver, etc., Appellant, v. BALDWIN 
M. BALDWIN, as Executor, etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Decedents' Estates-Partial Distribution-Appeal-Scope of 
Review.-An order striking a receiver's request for special 
llOtice of the filing of petitions, etc., in an estate proceeding 
may be reviewed on appeals from orders denying ratable, and 
directing partial, distribution. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 1014; [2, 4] 
Decedents' Estates,-§ 995; [3] Real Property; [5,9] Decedents' 
Estates, § 1000; [6] Decedents' Estates, § 1040; [7] Divorce and 
Separation, § 252; [8] Decedents; Estates, § 27; [10] Decedents' 
Estates, § 23. 
Feb. 1943] ESTATE OF BALDWIN-
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[2a-2c] ld.-Partial Distribution-Who May 'Petition-Receiver. 
-In Prob. Code, § 1010, enumerating persons entitled to peti-
,tion for a ratable distribution of an -estate, the ,vords"suc-
cessor in interest of any heir, devisee or legatee'~ are to be 
given a liberal interpretation; and embrace, II. recei~er ,IIUC-, - , 
ceeding to the right of possession of a legacy, no~withstancl­
ing his failure to acquire the predecessor's title thereto. 
[3] Real Property -..,; Interest. - The words "interest" and -"title" 
are not synonymous. 
[4] Decedents' Estates-Partial Distribution-Who M:l.Y Petition. 
-A person seeking distribution of a part of estatc property 
need not be entitled to all the attributes of ownership therein, 
in order to maintain his application. 
[5a, 5b] !d.-Partial Distribution-Opposition.-The fact that 
the personal representatives of an estate opposed an appli-
cation for ratable distribution filed by a receiver entitled to 
possession of a legacy does not deprive the court of jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate where the dispute does not involve obje(',-
tiori by the legatee. 
[6] Id.-..,;Firial Distribution-To Assignees or Grantec~Disputes. 
-The rule as to a court's lack of power to determine dis-
putes concerning the existence or the validity of the right 
asserted as the basis for distribution of a decedent's prop-
-erty otherwise than in conformity with the terms of the will 
or the law of succession, applies only in case of controversie~ 
between the parties directly affected, that _ is, between the 
heir, devisee or legatee and the contesting claimant. 
[7] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Receiver-Oollateral At, 
tack.-An order in a divorce action appointing a receiver to 
reduce a legacy to possession is not subject to collateral at-
tack in the probate proceeding where the order is valid on 
its face. 
[8] Decedents' Estates-Jurisdiction-Scope.-A court sitting in 
probate has jurisdiction to apply rules in equity or prinei, 
pIes of law when required to decide a qu"estion demanding 
settlement. It has the same power as the superior court in 
law and equity cases to hear and determine, in the mode pro~ 
vided by law, all questions of law and fact, the disposition of 
which is necessary to a proper judgment. 
[9] Id.-Partial Distribution-Opposition-By lteceivcr.-A re-
ceiver authorized to take possession of a legacy is a person 
[6] See ilB Oal.Jur. 799. 
[8] See llA Oal.Jur. 91. 
.-
